"• An immediate cease-fire
• A withdrawal of IDF troops
• Discussions with the Egyptians on the mechanism to prevent arms smuggling into Gaza
• Discussions on when and how to open up the border crossings.
One of the key elements to be determined is the duration of the cease-fire, with Hamas wanting another six-month cease-fire and Israel wanting something much longer."
What's not to love? A lot, for both sides. Israel only obtained 'discussions' with Egypt on ways to prevent arms smuggling; Hamas has only obtained 'discussions' on the opening of the border crossings. In other words, after over a thousand people have been killed, and countless more wounded and traumatized, both sides are agreeing to maintain the status quo, with the slightest of modifications.
There may be a real miracle at the negotiation table once the ceasefire is in effect. But what are the odds? As countless critics of the current operation have noted over and over again, Hamas is not weakened by harsh conditions in Gaza. The corollary is easy to see: it's not truly in Hamas's governing interest for life to significantly improve in Gaza. That they only want a six-month truce tips their hand -- they will regroup, and this whole thing will play out again. What can Israel do in response? Agree to six months of border crossings? Is there even any point?
A small glimmer of hope comes from this Ha'aretz report, which suggests a much deeper US investment in border security than many were expecting. Israel, apparently, hopes to gain the following:
"# A U.S. declaration calling on the international community to deal with the smuggling of arms from Iran to terrorist groups in the Gaza Strip.
# Intelligence cooperation between Israel and the U.S. for identifying the sources of weapons, with focus on the network linking Iran, the Persian Gulf and Sudan.
# An international maritime effort along the smuggling routes to find ships carrying weapons to the Gaza Strip, possibly with the involvement of NATO.
# An American and European commitment for the transfer of technologies to Egypt that will help it uncover tunnels.
# Plans for the economic development of Rafah, with particular emphasis on the Bedouin to undercut the financial motivation for building and operating tunnels. "
If the US has a vested financial interest in the success of the Cairo plan, it may be able to pressure Egypt into really working to maintain a truce. But even then, Israel's proposal still admits of a solely-Egyptian force on the Gaza/Sinai border. There's no love lost between the government of Egypt and Hamas, especially these days -- but will Israel bet the bank that sentiment in the Egyptian army is the same? That the army's competence, even with international tech, will be able to shut a notoriously difficult border? How sure is the Israeli government that Egypt is even capable of shutting down Hamas smuggling, let alone willing?
If I were to take this news like a real optimist, I'd say that any chance to legitimately and voluntarily lift the Gaza blockade is a chance worth taking. It's nice to see that critics were wrong to believe that the prospect was still years, at least, down the line. But I can't help but feel that a lifting of the blockade now won't matter in the slightest if, in six months, Hamas musters another rocket barrage. And the impatience, and useless indignation, from the UN and the world has done nothing but increase the chance of just such an event. It has forced both parties to rush to the table before anything was decided, and with doubts and ulterior motives still lingering.
The circumstances surrounding the Gaza war, and the possibility for a solution, remain the same today as they were three weeks or two years ago. The only chance to build support for a free and open Gaza is for Hamas to be permanently disarmed. If these "discussions" of counter-smuggling measures yield nothing more than further "discussions," absolutely nothing will have been achieved. And this time, it will not be Hamas or Israel that stands guilty for the wasted deaths of a thousand people. That weight will rest fully with the short-sighted and incompetent conflict management of the international community.
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4 comments:
Max:
Excellent post as always. One question: you say that the Gaza border is "notoriously difficult." Given Gaza's extraordinarily tiny size, with only 11 km bordering Egypt, why is this? It sometimes seems like the US and Mexico do a better job preventing drug smuggling along the Mexican border than the Egyptians do preventing arms smuggling along the Gazan border. Is it just that the Egyptian army has so little interest in preventing the smuggling?
And, to follow up on our discussion the other day: despite Erdogan's comments and Turkey's general antipathy towards Israel, doesn't Turkey have the most to gain by getting involved as a border patrol (and doing a good job at it) due to their difficulties in obtaining EU membership, their (legitimate) gripes with the US over Kurdistan, and the utility of gaining a greater influence in NATO?
On both points I'm out of my depth when it comes to the details. I think in both cases it comes down to the delicate balance that Arab governments have to maintain when they interact with Israel. You'll recall months ago, when Hamas blew up the Rafah barrier to allow Palestinians into Egypt. The army stood down, presumably on Mubarak's order. As he faces the constant threat of a popular insurgency from the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (the pan-Arab movement that spawned Hamas), who enjoy widespread support and take a hard line against Israel much more similar to the feelings of most Egyptians, Mubarak can't afford the spectacle of Egyptian soldiers shooting or manhandling Palestinians. It makes him look weak, and like a collaborator.
It's this same fear, I believe, that's behind Egypt's insistence that no multinational force violate its sovereignty in the Sinai. So you're right, it's more a political issue than a technological one. (Speaking of which, donations of counter-smuggling tech from EU and NATO countries are also 'political' donations, to try to hold Egypt accountable for whatever promises it makes concerning Rafah.)
You're right that the Turkey of today would have a lot to gain from a successful bid in Israel -- and it's totally possible that Israel was the party to walk away from the idea, perhaps in the hopes that NATO might intercede, or that Israel could take the Philadelphi corridor back. But it's also important to remember Turkey's own changing demographics, which have been trending toward Islamism in the past few years (a trend that many, at least here, suspect that Erdogan is privately encouraging). It doesn't help the Turkish government, which is plurality AKP, to get too cozy with Israel, when it stands a chance of gaining EU membership just based on its efforts in the Syrian diplomacy track. Not to mention Turkey's warm relations with Iran, which would be certain to cool almost instantly if it were seen as abetting stability in Israel.
All true, and thanks for the response - it's easy to forget how often a country's international political interests can die at the altar of domestic political considerations that outsiders poorly understand.
A few other things....
The internal Egyptian problems are why I've wondered why Egypt is often viewed as a viable intermediary (beyond the geographic necessity of their cooperation, I mean).
As for Turkey, the article you linked to suggested that it may have been Hamas' suggestion that Turkey get involved. If that were the case (and I realize this is beyond your best knowledge), wouldn't Turkey's involvement prevent Iran from doing much to Turkey for fear of creating a public rift with Hamas that would go over poorly with Iranians?
Anyways, I am working on a theory that would more or less argue that democratic leadership is actually more capable of overcoming public opinion in order to act in its perceived international best interest than autocratic leadership. But it's a very poorly developed theory and I may wind up rejecting it. Applied in this circumstance, it would argue that Turkey, despite the increasing popularity of Islamism, is far more capable of providing good-faith border security than Egypt precisely because it is a democracy.
But as I said, the theory is still poorly developed and will require awhile for me to be comfortable fully explaining. It's also not nearly as idealistic as it sounds, with the operative phrase being "perceived international best interest."
I'd be interested to hear it. As for Hamas, it's important to remember that they are only one part of Iran's bid for Mid East superpower status, and a relatively small part, at that. Turkey is a much more important ally because of its European connections and considerable armed forces.
If Hamas goes, Iran will simply invest in the next radical Palestinian group (Islamic Jihad, or the PPP, or something else). Or they'll skip it altogether and double down on Hizbullah. Either way, the point is that Hamas is small potatoes for Iran.
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