Regardless, let us think seriously for a moment. Who really believes the Iranians, as if in some re-do of Islamic hordes charging the Gates of Vienna, are set to perpetrate missile strikes against Europe? And while it is true the Shahab-3 missiles have a range of some 1200 or so miles (enough to reach Bulgaria or Greece, say) do we really believe they are keen to attack Athens, Bucharest or Sophia? Or indeed if they roll out a Shahab-4 with longer-range in coming years, that Vienna or Berlin will suddenly be in their sights? Why would the Iranians do this? Please let us not pretend in ribald fashion because they are but ‘mad Mullahs’ or some such, with a collective suicide wish. As I said, this is farcical, and displays an ignorance of the complexities of Iranian statesmanship and the behavior of the Iranian nation-state.
Given this back-drop, we therefore might forgive the Russians not believing us that the true rationale for the contemplated missile shield system is really about Iran—or some other to be concocted Middle Eastern rogue hell-bent on lobbing missiles into central Europe--rather than as is more likely another 'legacy' containment tool aimed at Moscow. (Nor does it help, indeed it adds rather a good dollop of insult to injury, that such anti-missile shields are to be based in former Warsaw Pact nations under Soviet dominion not so long ago.)
It may never reach the eyes or ears of President Obama. But if it reaches enough Americans, either directly or by proxy, they may begin to change their minds about what they want from their government.
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Just another opinion, if you'd like to see it. If not, then forget it. I'm sorry to have to differ with you, but Mr. Djerejian just can't be taken seriously. He has a lot of opinions couched in quasi-political rhetoric, but I just can't see any policy ideas in there at all.
He's fond of saying that we need dramatic openings and bold strokes, and relentless energy but, when he talks about the Middle East, the actual openings and strokes are anything but dramatic or bold. They've all been tried before. He wants "all instruments of American national power are used, and focus, intelligence and intensity are brought to bear consistently from the Presidential level on down, with pressure applied even-handedly to get to the (so elusive, but not impossible) goal-line." Wasn't this true of the 90s? As I remember it, Clinton used his considerable focus, intelligence and intensity and applied pressure even-handedly and got zilch out of it. If I had taken office after Clinton, I might not want to continue in this vein. I might just want to keep out of it, and see if that did any good, before I started spending my political capital. Then, he wants to attribute some of the failures on "isolating Arafat." At the time, I thought that this was the only way to restore our credibility, after Arafat's performance at the 2000 Camp David meetings. Clinton had just been royally dissed by Arafat. Bush was saying that if you dis Clinton, you're dissing me too, because you're dissing the presidency of the USA. Plus Arafat had completely destroyed his own credibility and only a fool would have trusted him again as a partner in serious negotiations.
This is why I can't take Djerejian seriously: "And once the immediate, and inevitable, crisis management clean-up of the recent wreckage in Gaza is accomplished (first we need to help, if through proxies, mediate schisms as between Hamas and the PA, as well as more directly liaise with differing Israeli factions set to squabble mightily during the impending political silly-season there, where we may well end up dealing with the re-emergence of Prime Minister Netanyahu after the elections), thereafter the Taba precedent should be speedily used as launching pad, of sorts, with additionally other bold strokes considered, like asking the Israelis to free Marwan Barghouti,so as to help restore Fatah as credible counter-party to Hamas."
This is just a vague to-do list, punctuated with bold strokes. As for freeing Barghouti, this is hardly applying "even handed pressure." Wasn't he convicted of serial murders in Israeli court? Is he seriously saying that Israel should just let him go? For what? I can't imagine what benefits there would be in such a thing, which--correct me if I'm wrong--would arouse almost universal opprobrium in Israel.
He refers to the "Grozny-like misery" of Gaza. This kind of hyperbole is just not acceptable if one wants to be taken seriously. Even now, reporters are just beginning to be allowed into Gaza and the reports I've seen do not support this outlandish claim. Maybe they will as more information becomes available, but the prudent thing to do, for an analyst as opposed to a propaganda-monger, is to wait and see before passing such a judgment.
When it comes to the subject of your own post, the "Russian question," Djerejian is similarly small-minded. He defeats the straw man of Iranians charging the Gates of Vienna pretty easily, but has no consideration for the geopolitics of this situation whatsoever. The diplomacy between Russia and the US is much too complex to be reduced to such pablum as he does. For example, we need a deal with Iran over the long-term stability of Iraq; Russia today is standing in Iran's corner. What would Djerejian do to get them to back off? Because if they did, Iran would be so isolated that we'd have them where we want them. The laundry-list that Djerejian proposes of "tracks" (the nuclear question, Hizbollah/Hamas, Iraq, Afghanistan, etc etc) is all related to the Russian "track," with its own tracks as well. What seems to Djerejian like a linear progression of "tracks" is really a kaleidescope. The "tracks" he mentions are a mixture of bargaining chips and strategic objectives. It doesn't make any sense at all and I'm sure that if anyone on the NSC saw it they'd scan it for two minutes with a puzzled look and then chuck it in the garbage.
Most of Gaza, especially the capital, Gaza City, remains largely intact. This is not Grozny after the Chechen war or Dresden after World War II. The hospitals are coping; shops are reopening; traffic is becoming a problem once again. Israel has tripled the amount of goods flowing in here since before the war.NYT
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