As usual, to know what Hamas actually wants, you have to dig deep. It's underneath the angry rhetoric, the empty calls for intifada, and even underneath most of the demands. Meshaal wants Israel to stop shooting, withdraw from Gaza, and lift the blockade? No kidding! Why didn't he say so sooner?
Most of the news organizations are only going that far in their coverage of the rejection. But Haaretz has this interesting tidbit:
Meshal said that any international monitoring force would be treated as an occupation force and Hamas said that before any negotiations could take place, Israel had to halt attacks, pull out of the Gaza Strip and lift the siege of Gaza.
He also insisted that Hamas be included, together with the Egyptians and the Europeans, in any monitoring system on the Rafah border.
Now that is a demand. Clear, focused, and perhaps even realistic. It comes to us alongside this similarly-worded dispatch from another Hamas higher-up:
The status of Gaza's borders with Egypt and Israel has also been a sticking point in the cease-fire discussions. Hamas has said it won't accept any deal that does not include the full opening of Gaza's border crossings and a role for Hamas in monitoring the borders.
I've been searching for details on how, precisely, Hamas wants to be involved with border patrol, to no avail. But the fact that they are only demanding a "role" in that process, rather than exclusive oversight, seems to suggest that it's a serious point of negotiation.
Hamas knows that Israel isn't going to withdraw from Gaza for at least the next few days -- not while rockets are continuing to fall in heavy numbers. (20 today, a lower number overall but still not exactly "safe".) They also must realize that a fuller ground operation is likely on the horizon. Israel knows it can't remain in a holding pattern forever, and the IDF is optimistic about its chances in the denser areas of the cities, even if the government is not.
In other words, it is now indisputably in the interest of Hamas to find a solution at the negotiating table. This graph, from the same article, seems to suggest they know it:
But a Hamas delegate in Cairo with colleagues from Gaza and Syria for talks with Egyptian officials on a truce said the group was not rejecting the initiative outright.
"If that was so, Hamas would not send delegates from inside [Gaza] and outside [Syria] to talk with the brothers in Egypt," Ayman Taha told Al-Arabiya Television. "The initiative has positive constructive points, though there are other points that need more discussions."
So, Hamas probably wants an agreement. So does Israel, according to sources within the Cabinet. But who wants it worse? That's the question that Israelis and Palestinians ought to be asking themselves as the prospect of a re-annexation of Gaza looms.
I'm no politician. But in a game of political chicken, I don't know that I'd want to be opposite an organization committed to suicide attacks (and regular attacks that are suicidal in their consequences). Hamas may ultimately be destroyed by a Gaza takeover. But long after they're dead, it will be Israel that has to live with a new occupation.
It's therefore in our interest to make the ceasefire workable, before a messy invasion. Israel ought to concede to allowing Hamas to maintain oversight of its borders, alongside Israeli forces on their respective border, and international forces along the Egyptian border. I don't know what harm there could be in such a concession, as long as non-Hamas monitors still have access to everything coming in and out. And in exchange for this concession, Israel can demand that international forces be stationed within Gaza, rather than Egypt. Egypt, (which has nearly as much of an interest in concluding this mess, as it is nothing but a daily public relations disaster for Mubarak) for its part, should exert serious pressure on Hamas to accept this trade. And if it is unable to do so, Egypt should accept a multinational force in the Sinai, as a good faith gesture to make up for Hamas's intractability.
In exchange for the total cessation of rocket fire from Gaza, Israel should agree to a formalized schedule for lifting the blockade. This is in any case in Israeli interests, as many have pointed out that miserable conditions in Gaza have done nothing to damage Hamas, and may in fact have strengthened the organization.
This schedule should include penalties for renewed violence from Hamas or its proxies, a framework which would make continued rocketing extremely disadvantageous, while at the same time preventing Israel from manipulating minimal attacks into cause for over-reaction. The timetable should also include bonuses, such as expedited border crossing, for good faith agreements made and held with Fatah, towards the formation of a unity government. Finally, as this timetable is very much desired by the international community, the UN security council should agree to a statement that, should Hamas reach a certain level of violence against the Negev, Israel has the full right to re-enter the Strip and clean house.
Last of all, in exchange for recognition as the governing authority of Gaza, Hamas should agree to hold regular elections, to be watched by international monitors -- with the first election scheduled for one to two years from the date of the ceasefire.
Such a global ceasefire agreement would address Israel's immediate security concerns, while also giving Hamas enough recognition, and enough incentives to the future, to keep it from resorting to random acts of violence. Hard-liners on either side who find fault with the terms would do well to remember how we got to this point in the first place. Israel and West's pursuit of an of a total blockade of Gaza did nothing to weaken Hamas, and led directly to renewed violence. As hard as it may be for us to stomach, recognition and minimal cooperation with Hamas is the only way to bring them back into the moderate fold, with the chance of merging the militants back into Fatah.
Likewise, Hamas members disinclined to cease rocket attacks on Israel ought to reflect on what the past two weeks have brought them. Their organization is close to collapse, and hundreds of their countrymen, many civilians, are dead. While there has certainly been international outcry, there has been no actual help, nor is there likely to be in the near future. Hamas members keeping score would do well to note that while the world is watching, it is not intervening -- and their time is running out. With the concessions above made by Israel, it should be clear that the path to legitimacy, statehood, and ultimately prosperity lies not through Israel, but with it. But deviation from the line, in the form of any violence, would result in a quick reversion to the status quo.
Posts
0 comments:
Post a Comment