We may now be beginning to exit the woods, although part of why I kept mum yesterday (aside from my now-broken promise to get away from Gaza for a bit) is that I'm not totally ready to believe it yet. Where do goals and expectations stand now for both sides?
Israel wants violence to cease, so that it can withdraw its forces after a successful, if messy and possibly inhumane, campaign. Israel wants Hamas to commit to an open-ended truce that will guarantee the security of its souther region. Israel wants Gilad Schalit back. Israel expects the international community, led by the US and Europe, to take a more proactive role in shutting down Gaza smuggling, with the ultimate goal to weaken Iranian influence in the region. Down the road, Israel wants to find a way to destroy Hamas. Israel does not expect to be forced directly to the table with Hamas.
Hamas wants time to rebuild its organization, and most likely to rearm, as well. Hamas wants Israel to open the Gaza border so that it can more easily bring goods, and probably weapons, through the crossings. Hamas wants to find a way to declare victory in this conflict, as Hizbullah did in 2006. Hamas wants to reinforce its ties with Iran, and to find a way to work with Egypt, or bring the Muslim Brotherhood into power there. Hamas wants Abu Mazen to step down, and for new elections to be held in the West Bank, where it hopes to claim victory. Barring that, Hamas wants to take over the West Bank via some other means. Hamas may also still be seeking the destruction of Israel, although its confused stance on ceasefire negotiations seems to suggest that there is some internal division over this.
Their fears:
Israel fears that Hamas will be able to continue smuggling through Egypt the supplies it needs to build more rockets. Israel fears that within a few weeks or months, Hamas may begin firing again. Israel fears that an opening of crossings in Gaza will only increase the speed of Hamas's rearmament. Israel fears that, in the event of another attack, it will have no choice but to re-occupy Gaza, no matter the world outcry. Israel fears that if Hamas can prove its resistance bona fides to Iran, their ties may deepen. Israel fears that removal of Abu Mazen, and any weakening of Fatah. Israel fears a weak Mubarak. Israel fears that Gilad Schalit may be unreachable.
Hamas fears that Egypt may actually commit to its anti-smuggling promises, and that the rocket game may really be coming to an end. Hamas fears the serious lack of empathy on display in the West Bank. Hamas fears the coming comparisons to Hizbullah, which will note that Hamas failed to live up to Hizbullah's strategy in almost every way -- and the damage this will do to its ties to Iran. Hamas fears a reoccupation of Gaza, and it fears Fatah's hold on the West Bank. Hamas fears that Israel may find an excuse not to open up the border crossings. Hamas may not, but should, fear that its support will wane in the event of open borders and a higher standard of living in Gaza.
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Israel will never believe that Hamas would voluntarily lay down its arms, because Hamas is permanently established as the enemy. Hamas will never believe that Israel would honestly seek to improve Gaza, for the same reason. This is why a timetable is absolutely necessary. Both sides need to be able to look at a clear list of expectations to reassure themselves that, in good faith or not, they are being dealt with as they were promised. Here's what that timetable should look like:
1. For the first two months, Israel fully opens the Karni crossing, which is used primarily for transport of goods and cargo into Gaza, and is vital to providing supplies to Gazans. All shipments into Gaza are fully inspected by Tzahal before entry. Any renewal in hostilities from Hamas does not involve in a closure, but rather an immediate military retaliation by Israel.
2. At the end of two months of unbroken quiet, Israel opens the Erez crossing to limited foot traffic in and out of Gaza. Shin Bet monitors the crossing, with no Hamas members allowed to enter or leave under any circumstances outside of negotiations with Israel. No one is allowed to enter Gaza who does not already live there. All those who leave Gaza are given only one or two days before temporary permits expire. Gradually, over the course of SIX MORE MONTHS of continuous peace, the amount of traffic allowed through the crossing is increased, and restrictions on the length of visits outside the strip are eased. Special permits and exceptions may be issued to students, or those wishing to travel abroad.
3. After eight total months of continuous peace, the Rafah crossing may be opened to limited foot traffic, under the same conditions governing Erez. This is the critical test. Assuming that Egypt has kept its promises regarding smuggling, the question becomes whether Egypt is capable of acting in good faith with a Hamas which is likely still bent, ultimately, on the destruction of Israel. Restrictions on Rafah are eased in the same manner they were in Erez, over the course of the next six months. By the fourteenth month, full foot traffic and partial permits are allowed through all border crossings.
If, at any time, Hamas or one of its secondaries should resume violence against Israel, the process rolls back one step. (Rafah closes, but Erez remains open; Erez closes, but Karni remains open; Karni remains open, but Israel strikes militarily.) "Resumed violence" in this case does not mean a single rocket, or two or five, but rather indicates one week of continuous or extremely frequent fire -- or one month in which Hamas fired on average one rocket every two days, or more.
This is as far as I've gotten so far. But coming soon: elections in the territories, settlement removal, and more.
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3 comments:
I have two questions for you:
1) Absent the Gaza campaign, what would envision your incremental proposal with a ratchet (a very good thing, that ratchet) do intnerally, in Gaza, and to the character of Hamas (which I do not think monolithic, although more now than last month).
2) Same question, in this now.
I think your plan a good one, avoiding pursuit of an abstract peace which has been frozen since at least 96. I truly wish that your plan's emphasis on recovery could be seen by people who matter.
I think, however, that in speaking of what Hamas now is, we should remember what they offered after winning, quite legitimately, election. In othr words, you may not know Hamas as well as you think; I surely don't know it well.
My hope would be that improving conditions in Gaza would ultimately undermine Hamas's authority. Armed resistance looks the most senseless when there is little to resist. If I'm understanding your question...
I'm aware of the Hamas proposal you're talking about, but I hesitate to lend the organization that kind of political negotiation continuity. As you yourself has said, the electoral victory caught Hamas by surprise. I think, in terms of policy, they've been winging it ever since, and changing the rules whenever it suited them. Their confused reaction to the ceasefire, when some leaders accepted it, and some rejected it, is just the latest manifestation of the issue.
For some reason my password doesn't work, so I had to enter as a new identity.
No Max, I don't think so. What seems to have happened on the cease fire is that those living the war wanted it, more or less, but the exhiled military commander did not. Which is a good thing. Those in Gaza view the death differently than those without.
I think you may well be wrong about Hamas' offer of an extended truce after that election. We will never know now. One thing I've noticed, it can be a big mistake to paint these social resistence movements in a single color. Look at what happened in Northern Ireland; and consider that the former leftest guerrilas in El Savador were/are serious contenders for the Presidency there. If we decide to make Hamas a monster from the outset, I think 1) we cannot really articulate how your plan might alter things; and 2) come close to forcing the Gazan war just past as the only "possible" act.
Think more about how improving conditions would undermine Hamas' authority. Who would be getting the first goods, controling import/export access internally.
How this could lead to contention between some Hamas and Islamic Jihad. Hamas isn't going to go away; but it might transform, partly.
Finally, I would say the possible internal dynamic of your plan (in Gaza) may have significantly changed post war.
I think we cannot afford to think of Hamas as monolythic. They are supported by people in great distress. They distress people to stay in control. They help people to stay in control. I think the prevalent Israeli "Hamas must be destroyed" logic is primitive. And has lead to primitive action.
I am on neither side. If Fatah had allowed a more open administration several years ago, Hamas might well not be where it is today. It did win that election. And the Hamas Gazan leadership said thereafter that they wanted to focus on internal development, not Israel. To dismiss this as inherantly untrustworthy has lead to the deaths of 1000. And which side is closer to their brand of victory?
That's why I wonder: what dynamic would your plan implemented set off in Hamas and greater Gaza?
Thanks for answering.
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